The richness and the importance of Florence during the 14 th and 15 th centuries are well known all around the world. However only few people know that behind this richness there was a banking group -Banco de' Medici -managed similarly to a nowadays bank colossus. This paper presents an analysis of the governance and accountability systems of this bank. Based both on precious documents of the Florence State Archive and on the existing literature, this paper offers an in-depth study of one of the earliest examples in the world of a bank holding company. In order to understand both the true nature of the Banco de' Medici group and the links between holdings and subsidiaries, the governance and the accounting records of the main headquarters in Florence and the Lyon branch were investigated. This article contributes to literature shedding new light on the structure of this important bank, the relationship between the holding company and its subsidiaries and on the relationship between its majority and minority shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
uring the 14 th and 15 th century, Florence was not only the capital of culture but also the heart of the European financial system. A number of wealthy Florentine merchants, typically involved in traditional sectors such as the wool and silk trade, started to provide financial services to support international trade thus becoming merchant bankers (Brun, 1930; De Roover, 1941; Sapori, 1932) . Some of them became so powerful that they were able to finance popes and kings, wars and alliances: the most important certainly were the Medici.
The Medici family gradually expanded its banking activity internationally by establishing what nowadays would be defined as branches, not only within the Italian market -in cities like Rome, Venice, Milan, and Naples -but also throughout Europe in the most important European trade centres such as London, Geneva, Bruges, and Lyon. The Florentine bank headquarters, called "Tavola di Firenze", were responsible for coordinating international banking operations. The headquarters were known as the "Tavola di Firenze" (Table of Florence) because of the name "tavolieri" (seated at the table) given to the Florentine bankers, as they performed their business seated behind a counter or table.
The accounting history of the Medici bank (Banco de' Medici) has not been widely studied, with the exception of the research carried out during the period between the 1940s and 1960s by De Roover (1955) . This lack of interest is surprising, as the Medici Bank represents one of the first examples of a bank holding company, which employed accountability techniques and governance systems quite similar to those in practice today.
Previous literature suggests that accounting systems not only provide quantitative information, they also reflect the economic, social and institutional context in which they were developed (Riccaboni et al., 2006) . By examining the documentary sources of the Banco de' Medici -the first banking group in Europe -therefore, it is possible to In addition to the headquarters, the Medici opened branches in Venice, Naples and Gaeta. This structure remained unaltered at the bank until 1426. Table 1 shows the distribution of the profits of the Medici bank from October 1, 1397 until September 1, 1420. The profits are values net of resources allocated to cope with unrecoverable credits and the compensation of the branch director. He was not merely a bank employee earning a salary, but rather a partner who participated in the profits.
Among these profits, only a portion remained within the company for self-financing, while the most significant amount was allocated to purchase real estate in the name of various family members.
The most profitable branch was that established in Rome, since it was closely linked with the Papal Court, which used the Medici Bank to deposit and transfer funds. The years from 1397 to 1425 can be considered the first period in the history of the Medici bank. Only a few years later, in February 1429, the founder Giovanni di Bicci died, after having gradually bequeathed the management of the bank to his two sons: Cosimo and Lorenzo.
The Golden Age (1426-1463)
The second period is undoubtedly the most glorious and it coincides with the rise to power of Cosimo (1395-1440). During the first years under his direction the earnings of the bank, as recorded in "secret book" number two (1420-1435), were high thanks to the usual contribution from the branch in Rome, but also to the capability of the director of the new foreign branch, in Geneva.
Thanks to the big profitability and the favourable trend, Cosimo implemented a policy of expansion, both in Italy and abroad, which was often associated with political opportunities.
The next step involved the opening of branches in Bruges in 1439 and Pisa in 1442. Then, in 1446, the Medici established a bank in London, and another in Avignon, which was considered the most important commercial centre in southern France. The Milan branch was the final one opened by the Medici in 1452 and marked the end of the period of expansion and prosperity for the bank.
Therefore, in 1452, the Medici group included the holding company in Florence, as well as the Italian branches in Rome, Venice, Pisa and Milan, the foreign branches of Geneva, Bruges, London and Avignon, and two businesses devoted to the production of silk and wool ( Figure 1 ). Table 2 shows, in the second column, the capital invested by the Medici in each company of the group, in addition to the capital contributed by other shareholders, who were often the bank directors. The Fall (1464-1494)
The third period in the life of the Medici Bank marks its gradual decline, which began just before the death of Cosimo in 1464 and ended in 1494 with the expulsion of the Medici family from Florence. During these thirty years the management of the bank was taken over by Piero (1464 Piero ( -1469 , the son of Cosimo, and then by Lorenzo the Magnificent (1469-1492), the eldest son of Piero, and finally by Piero II, the son of Lorenzo (1492-1494).
The greatest strength of Cosimo de Medici was his ability to choose the right person for the job of running the holding bank and its branches, giving them broad decision-making power, without completely conceding strategic control of the bank. Lorenzo the Magnificent, a brilliant statesman, did much the same, but nevertheless showed a lack of aptitude for business and a modest interest in the affairs of the bank, often leaving too much decision making power to the branch directors, who sometimes took personal advantages.
The many difficulties that affected the economy in Florence, the decrease in credit adopted by Piero -the son of Cosimo -the currency fluctuation, the decline in the flow of funds from the Pope, and the enormous financing of military campaigns were the main reasons for the decline of the Medici bank. The situation was certainly not helped by the unsuitability of Piero II in the administration of the bank, as well as in entrusting the management to capable directors.
ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP THROUGH ITS GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM The Group Structure and its Historical Reasons
The Medici bank marks a key turning point, especially when compared to other contemporary organizational models.
A study of the significant companies of the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciauoli families reveals that they all featured a strongly centralized structure (Sapori, 1926) . On the other hand, the Medici Bank adopted a completely different organizational structure. With a structure reminiscent of the Datini model (Melis, 2014) , the Medici company was not made up of one sole corporate body, but the main headquarters, located in Florence may be compared to a holding company. Each branch was a distinct company with its own name, equity, administration and accounting books and each branch treated the others as customers. The branch's directors had to settle their accounts once a year and send a copy of the balance sheet and the profit and loss account to the holding company.
To better understand the strategic and organizational decisions taken by the Medici, and evaluate their management abilities, it is necessary to consider the importance of the teachings of the church doctrine regarding usury. Indeed, the bank structures typical of the time and the techniques employed often reflected the need to find lawful means to bypass the constraints of usury.
It should be noted that the concept of usury, according to the law of the time, was very wide, so wide as to include any type of interest gained upon capital. A loan had to be granted for free; otherwise it would be interpreted as a contract of usury. The method bankers used most often to escape the accusation of usury was the exchange by letters, which consisted of the negotiation of bills payable in other markets, usually in different currencies. The bill, otherwise known as a "lettera di cambio" (bill of exchange), included interest in its nominal value, which was, however, disclosed as a commission or a transaction fee. In this way the Medici bank used the commission included in its bills of exchange as implicit interest rates for their loans. This activity was possible thanks to the international structure of the group and the presence of many branches of the bank all around Europe. Creating an interconnection between banking activities and the exchange most likely served as an incentive to open a number of new branches in various markets, creating something, within the bank, very similar to what is now known as a bank holding, controlling a group of subsidiary companies.
This was the way used by the Medici family to build and enlarge its banking group and to make profits.
The Organizational Structure and the Compensation System
With reference to the subjects operating within the bank organization, it is possible to identify two figures, also mentioned in other medieval trade documents: the "compagno" and the "fattore" (Elder, 1934) .
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The Clute Institute "Compagno" was the term generally used to indicate the shareholder. He signed the partnership agreement and had the right to a share of profits. Even if working within the company, he did not earn a salary, merely a reimbursement of expenses if he resided abroad.
"Fattore" indicates an employee of a foreign branch assisting the director. This figure was usually associated with the company by a notary agreement that described his tasks, limited his powers and defined his related obligations. The "fattore" earned a salary, but did not receive a share of the profits.
It is interesting to observe that the Medici family's behaviour was unusual for the medieval economic environment. The director of a branch, chosen from among the personnel, was usually promoted to the rank of minority shareholder, and earned a fixed sum for maintenance expenses, integrated with a share of the profits.
Therefore, according to this medieval form of "stock option," a proactive "fattore" had the possibility of becoming a director and, thereafter, shareholder, thus providing him with an effective incentive to work productively. The idea of the Medici family to structure the bank as a group of companies was, therefore, suitable to this purpose. The group structure, indeed, gave the possibility to a number of "fattore" in each branch to become a shareholder so providing them an economic incentive to improve the global performance of the group.
The Relationship Between Majority and Minority Interests
The Banco de' Medici holding company generally possessed more than 50% of the equity of its subsidiaries (Table  3) . Moreover, a partnership agreement clearly specified that the "maggiori" (majority members) had the authority to control the company, even if the Medici were not that concerned with frequently inspecting their branches. This was one of the factors that led some branches to bankruptcy (the Bruges branch being the most significant case). 
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The Clute Institute However, while the retention of the majority of shares limited the decision-making power of minority shareholders, the Medici family was willing to make concessions in the distribution of profits. According to the formula of incentives that they followed, agreement clauses provided more than proportional profit shares to minority shareholders, as demonstrated by the act dated March 25, 1435, regarding the Venice branch (Florence State Archive, MAP, 153, n. 2, , in which the holding company contributed the bulk of the equity (7,000 ducats of 8,000), receiving a minor share of profits in order to reward the directors.
However, holding the majority of the equity was not the only means the Medici used to control branches. Each partnership agreement contained a clause stipulating the ownership of their "trademark", along with the accounting books and other records upon the closure of a business.
The Bookkeeping System
Regarding to the bookkeeping system we found that the director of the holding company in Florence kept the "secret books", which contain the accounting records concerning relationships between the shareholders and the company. Three of the "secret books" have survived:
• "secret book" no. 1 (1397 -1420);
• "secret book" no. 2 (1420 -1435);
• "secret book" no. 3 (1435 -1451).
Moreover, it must be emphasized that each branch kept a "secret book", a "cash book", a "book of creditors and debtors", the denomination of which often varied. For instance, in the Court of Rome it was called "Black book marked G", while elsewhere (the "Tavola di Firenze" and Venice branches) it was known as the "Red book marked G".
Since the first two books are fragmentary, and do not provide any practical information about the accounting profile, attention can be concentrated on the third "secret book". The most interesting part regards the opening lines, which emphasize that the accounting book was kept according to the "Venetian" practice, a double entry method:
"E tegniallo alla viniziana, nell'una faccia il dare e nell'altra l'avere, e lle due faccie mettiamo per una charta"
Looking at the accounting system at that time a distinction must be made between accounting practice and doctrine. With regard to the former, a sufficiently advanced and correct double entry method had been developed in Italy, particularly in the city-states of Venice, Genoa and Florence, through the practice of merchants and traders, beginning in the early 13 th century (de Roover, 1956; Mills, 1994; Taylor, 1935) . Previous accounting books had contained only credit and debit accounts. Nevertheless, the doctrinal arrangement only refers to the work of Pacioli, often described as "the father of accounting" (Hatfield, 1924; Langer, 1948; Taylor, 1942; Stevelink, 1986; Weis and Tinius, 1991) While Luca Pacioli may not have truly invented the double entry method (Hernàndez-Esteve, 1994), it should be recognized that he was the first to organically treat the subject, and was responsible for the widespread adoption of the method. Thanks to the publication of Pacioli's work, the double entry method spread through Italy, among the majority of the numerous commercial, banking and navigation companies, and was also adopted by the monastic guilds. In a short time, the method became so well known that it began to spread to other countries, such as France, the Low Countries and Germany, to the extent that double entry came to be known outside Italy as the "Italian method" (Luchini, 1898) .
A further issue, interesting also nowadays is related to the uncollectible credits. Since the accumulation of uncollectible credits was one of the more serious threats to the solvency of the bank, it was the director's responsibility to check the balances and control each individual entry, pointing out late or insolvent debtors and other irregularities.
The fear of uncollectible credits was so strong that, in their company agreements, banks usually inserted two clauses: one clause imposed the constitution of a special reserve for uncollectible credits, and the other prohibited the granting of credit to anyone who was not a "trustworthy merchant". The attention of the Medici family to the uncollectible credits shows us that this topic was relevant also at that time and not only nowadays. It is interesting to notice that the instruments used to reduce the uncollectible credits were the same than nowadays: a "rating" to select only the "trustworthy merchants" and a special reserve in the balance sheet.
THE HOLDING COMPANY: "TAVOLA DI FIRENZE"
The "Tavola di Firenze" was the Florentine holding of the Banco de' Medici. The "Tavola di Firenze" dealt with exchange letters and currency exchange, and gave financial support to the import/export transactions of Florentine merchants. 
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The Clute Institute ( A general idea of the "Tavola di Firenze" businesses and managerial policies can be obtained through the analysis of its balances sheets and accounting data. Among the few documents available, it was decided to focus on the first balance sheet, dating back to 1427 (Table 4) (ASF, Catasto, 51, cc, 1162 -1168 . In Table 4 it can be observed that:
• the assets typical of banking activity were more prominent than trade assets; indeed, unlike the activities of other contemporary bankers, the investments of the "Tavola di Firenze" in trade, especially in wool and silk, were limited and of little relevance; • there was scarce availability of cash reserves, which would not have been sufficient to cover a possible lack of liquid funds. This practice was common however, even among other bankers who, in the occurrence of a financial crisis, preferred to pay from their personal wealth, rather than keep noninvested funds within the bank; • there were some "personal" accounts of the partners, which recorded the sums paid in by members of the Medici family and other partners and the loans granted to them for personal use; • the total assets did not tally with the total liabilities and equities, probably due to an incorrect observance of double entry principles.
The Medici essentially preferred to operate using loans in the form of deposits, whereas they reduced the use of personal capital to the minimum. Such a strategy ensured high earnings, thanks to the existing spread between the interest rates applied on the loans and those paid to depositors. The capital of the "Tavola di Firenze" amounted to 12,000 "fiorini", and corresponded to almost a tenth of the total financing resources. The "Tavola di Firenze" however, was not the only undercapitalized company, since the Rome branch was also operating with no equity. The directives Moreover, the Lyon branch had the exclusive right to sell Papal indulgences, and this activity, while not recorded as an operational activity, represented 28% of the affiliate's profits.
The revenues registered as "merchandise" were linked to the trade undertaken by the Lyon branch. The entry "profits of the agency in Genève" may be a type of consolidated profit. Indeed, the Geneva branch had been closed in 1465, with all activities transferred to Lyon. All that remained in Switzerland was an office detached from the French subsidiary, which dealt with the closure of previous transactions. With regard to costs, there are no entries that merit specific comment, except perhaps the "house expenses" that were always present in the profit and loss accounts of the Medici branches. CONCLUSIONS
The accounting history of the Medici bank has not been previously sufficiently explored. Such a lack of interest is quite surprising, since the Medici Bank represents one of the first examples of a bank holding company, employing accountability techniques and governance systems that were not so different from those used today.
In this article we investigated the governance and the accounting system of this important banking group shedding new light on its structure, the relationship between the holding company and its subsidiaries and on the relationship between majority and minority shareholders.
Our research is based on the documentation available in the State Archive of Florence, which holds the entire collection of original documents regarding the Medici family, from the very beginning until the extinction of the dynasty.
As highlighted, the Banco de' Medici was not made up of one sole corporate body, and the main headquarters, located in Florence and called "Tavola di Firenze", can be compared to a holding company. The "Tavola di Firenze" did not count among its members only those related to the Medici family, but also encompassed the participation of members from outside the family. Each branch was a distinct subsidiary company with its own name, equity, administration and accounting books. Each branch treated the others as customers, realizing as nowadays intercompany operations.
This paper makes some relevant contributions to the previous business and economics literature shedding new light on financial practices and innovations at that time able to affect the real economy in following centuries. In detail we found evidence that the Banco de' Medici was essentially a bank holding company, the first in Europe and that it facilitated both domestic and international trade with its structure and practices. It should be noticed that the Medici family cleverly used its holding company structure to provide strong incentives for individual bank managers to perform more effectively and to facilitate the techniques of the day that were used to circumvent very problematic usury laws. In the end, with this article we also make some relevant contributions to the accounting literature shedding new light on the adoption of double-entry accounting methods before the Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionalità of Luca Pacioli and on the accounting treatment of the uncollected credits.
